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We investigate the industry dimension of bank lending and its role in the 
monetary transmission mechanism in Germany. We use dynamic panel methods to 
estimate bank lending functions for eight industries for the period 1992-2002. Our 
evidence shows that bank lending growth predominantly depends on the industry 
composition of bank loan portfolios, both through the underlying cyclical fluctuations 
in industry-specific bank credit demand and through industry-specific credit supply 
effects. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on monetary transmission emphasizes the interest rate and credit channel as important 
propagation and amplification mechanisms of changes in monetary policy. Both channels predict bank 
lending to respond to monetary policy actions. While the direction of change is similar, the underlying 
reasons differ. The credit view explains monetary-policy-induced movements in bank lending with 
changes in loan supply, whereas the interest rate channel stresses changes in loan demand.  
 
The  role  of  interest  rates  as  joint  determinant  of  credit  demand  and  supply  complicates  the 
identification of the interest rate and credit channel effects of monetary policy. In order to identify loan 
supply effects, empirical studies typically rely on disaggregated bank data. A large literature employs 
bank-level data to account for bank heterogeneity in terms of asset size (Kashyap and Stein, 1995), 
liquidity  (Kashyap  and  Stein,  2000),  and  capitalization  (Peek  and  Rosengren,  1995).  These 
characteristics  are  assumed  to  identify  loan  supply  effects,  reflecting  cross-bank  variation  in  the 
severity of asymmetric information problems and in banks’ ability to offset monetary-policy-induced 
changes in deposits with alternative sources of funding. Typically, most empirical studies of such 
credit supply effects include macroeconomic output and price variables to proxy for credit demand. In 
this  setup,  possible  heterogeneity  in  firm  –  industry  –  credit  demand  is  ignored.  Similarly, 
heterogeneity in corporate balance sheets and its effect on credit supply is not explicitly taken into 
account. Finally, differences in the industry structure of banks’ credit portfolio are assumed away. In 
turn, monetary policy effectiveness is assumed to be independent of the industry structure of credit 
portfolios.  
 
We hypothesize that borrower heterogeneity may significantly affect bank lending through demand 
and supply effects.
1 Ideally, our analysis would build on firm-level as well as bank-level data. Bank-
level data allow for the identification of credit channel effects of monetary policy through banks’ 
balance sheets, while firm-level data would allow for firm-specific credit demand effects and balance 
sheet – credit supply – effects. Unfortunately, firm-level data of sufficient quality are unavailable.   3 
However, we are able to use a unique set of bank lending data at the industry level and estimate bank 
lending functions across individual banks for eight different industries. Rather than using aggregate 
macroeconomic price and output variables to proxy for (aggregate) credit demand, we use industry-
specific prices and output as proxy variables for industry-specific credit demand.  
 
A few caveats are in order. First, analogous to other studies we are unable to explicitly account for 
corporate balance sheet effects on credit supply due to lack of appropriate data. Second, differences in 
bank lending functions across industries may also include credit-supply effects, for instance in case 
excluded  industry  characteristics  affect  bank-customer  relations  and  bank  credit  portfolio 
compositions. In the empirical analysis we attempt to control for these effects. Third, output and price 
variations may not only proxy for credit demand effects but also have credit supply effects. Here, we 
follow  the  accepted  practice  in  the  literature  which  typically  links  output  and  price  movements 
exclusively  to  cyclical  (demand)  characteristics.  In  addition,  we  note  that  German  banking  was 
characterized by strong bank-customer relations over the sample period, reducing the potential impact 
of temporarily low output on credit supply. 
 
The  evidence  shows  that  industry  lending  predominantly  responds  to  changes  in  industry  credit 
demand rather than to monetary policy changes. Evidence in favor of credit channel – supply – effects 
of monetary policy crucially depends on the choice of industry. In view of these findings, we conclude 
that  the  industry  composition  of  credit  cannot  be  ignored  in  empirical  research  on  the  monetary 
transmission mechanism. Future research should take this into account. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing evidence on the credit channel 
effects of monetary policy in Germany. Section 3 presents the data and stylized facts with respect to 
lending to different industries across the three main German banking groups. Section 4 specifies the 
empirical model and the estimation strategy. Section 5 reports the empirical results and provides a 
discussion. We conclude in section 6.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 See Deutsche Bundesbank (1996) for supportive empirical evidence.    4 
 
2. The Credit Channel Effects of Monetary Policy in Germany 
 Most studies on the bank lending effects of monetary policy rely on macroeconomic data, as sector, 
firm and bank-level data are not widely available. However,Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta and Terlizzese 
(1999),  Dedola and Lippi (2005) argue that relevant differences in the monetary policy response of 
different  groups  within  one  country  may  go  unnoticed  with  macroeconomic  data.
2  As  a  partial 
solution,  some  empirical studies distinguish  the  monetary  policy  response  of bank  lending  across 
different groups (Dale and Haldane 1995, Barran, Coudert, and Mojon 1997, Kakes, Sturm, and Maier 
2001, Kakes and Sturm 2002, and De Haan 2003). These studies exploit the between-group variation 
in agents and markets, but not the within-group variation.  
 
In contrast, microeconomic studies also exploit within-group heterogeneities to identify the credit 
demand  and  supply  effects  of  monetary  policy.  Several  microeconomic  studies  for  Germany  use 
BankScope  data  (De  Bondt  1998;  Favero,  Giavazzi,  and  Flabbi  1999;  Altunbaş,  Fazylov,  and 
Molyneux 2002). Their conclusions differ, possibly due to the choice of estimation method and sample 
period. Because the BankScope data suffer from a  large sample bias, Ehrmann et al. (2003) and 
Worms (2003) use microeconomic data compiled by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Both studies estimate 
the response of bank lending growth to changes in credit demand and monetary policy using dynamic 
panel models. Their results point to the transmission of monetary policy shocks through bank lending. 
Effects  originate  from  cross-bank  differences  in  liquidity  (Ehrmann  et  al.,  2003)  and  cross-bank 
heterogeneities  in  liquidity  and  capitalization  (Worms,  2003).
3  While  Ehrmann  et  al.  (2003)  and 
Worms (2003) allow for bank heterogeneity, they still assume customer homogeneity, as do most 
other studies in this field. Exceptions are Fuinhas (2006) and Ciccarelli, Maddaloni and Peydró (2010) 
who distinguish between corporate and private – household – loans. Jiménez et al. (2010) match loan 
                                                            
2 We refer to Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin (2010) for a similar criticism. 
3 Related work emphasizes relationship banking (De Haan and Sterken, 2006), reduced quantitative 
lending  constraints  due  to  easier  bank  access  to  market-based  funding  (Disyatat,  2010),  asset 
securitization (Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marqués, 2009), and bank riskiness (Altunbas et al., 2010) 
as additional transmission channels that mitigate bank lending effects of monetary policy. 
   5 
supply with both firm and bank identity using Spanish data and conclude that if proper account is 
taken of firm specific determinants of loan demand, stronger bank lending channel effects are found. 
In our view, allowing for customer heterogeneity may be a crucial element in identifying bank lending 
effects of monetary policy. Our paper – which in set up is close Jimenez et al. (2010) - aims to 
contribute to the literature by testing for the effects of both bank and customer (industry) heterogeneity 
on bank lending. 
 
A caveat applies with respect to the balance sheet effect of monetary policy. Theoretically, the sign of 
the  balance  sheet  effect  is  undetermined.  Contractionary  monetary  policy  causes  credit  supply  to 
contract, while credit demand may either expand or contract (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Trautwein, 
2000). Similar to existing studies, our analysis cannot identify the balance sheet effects on credit 
supply or demand.  Given that existing empirical research lends no or weak support to the existence of 
balance sheet effects in Germany – see, for instance, Mojon, Smets, and Vermeulen (2002), Chatelain 
et al. (2003), Arnold and Vrugt (2004) and  Von Kalckreuth (2003) –  we feel confident that ignoring 
the balance sheet effect will  not significantly affect our conclusions. 
 
3. Data 
In the empirical analysis, we use quarterly data for the period 1992-2002. Bank-level data on balance 
sheet variables and lending to individual industries are obtained from the quarterly borrower statistics 
and the monthly bank balance sheet statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The analysis is confined to 
financial institutions which have the status of a monetary financial institution (MFI) throughout the 
whole sample period.  
 
Industry  data  are  compiled  for  eight  industries  at  the  one-digit  industry  level:  Energy  (Mining, 
Quarrying and Utilities), Manufacturing, Construction, Agriculture (including Forestry and Fishing), 
Service, Trade (Wholesale and Retail), Transport (including Communication) and Finance (including 
Insurance)  as  well  as  for  the  grand  total  of  all  industries.  For  most  industries,  information  on   6 
production and prices is available at a monthly frequency from the New Cronos database. For the 
remaining industries, industry output is approximated with industry value added, provided by the 
German statistical office. Information on industry prices is only available as of 1995:1. In order to 
approximate the 1992:1-1994:4 values, we regress the industry-specific price index against a constant 
and  the  contemporaneous value  of the  aggregate  price  index  and  use the coefficient  estimates  to 
extrapolate the missing values. The resulting quarterly data series have been searched for outliers 
using a sequential outlier rejection (SOR) algorithm (Corney, 2002) which accounts for the effect of 
outliers on the standard error and does not assume a normal distribution. 
3.1 Stylized facts on German bank and industry data 
Whether monetary policy mainly works through short-term or long-term interest rates and credit and is 
able to influence – expectations of – longer-term interest rates and the slope of the yield curve still is a 
widely debated issue. For a recent overview from the perspective of central bank communication we 
refer to Blinder et al. (2008). Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Kakes and Sturm (2002) suggest short-
term lending responds immediately to changes in monetary policy, while long-term lending does not. 
Short-term loans are also more likely to respond to cyclical fluctuations in credit demand. Also Boivin 
et al. (2010) argue that the balance sheet effect of monetary transmission operates through the short-
term rather than the long-term interest rate.  
 
Here, we will focus on short-term lending by German banks as our dependent variable.
 4 First, we 
briefly  describe  the  lending  patterns  of  German  banks  and  the  industry  structure  of  their  credit 
portfolios, distinguishing the three main banking groups in the German banking system: public savings 
banks, commercial banks, and credit cooperatives.
5  
 
Table 1 summarizes the industry composition of credit portfolios by reporting short-term lending to 
                                                            
4 Unreported results for aggregate lending are qualitatively similar and available from the other on request.  
5 Private savings banks, large Land saving banks as  well  as central credit institutes are excluded from the 
analysis, because they operate under a different institutional setting and serve different customers. We refer to 
Worms (2003) and Hackethal (2004) for comprehensive descriptions of the balance sheet structure of banking 
groups in Germany.   7 
industry i (i=1,…8) by banking group j (j=1,…3).
6 We express lending to industry i as a share of 
lending  to  the  grand  total  of  industries.  Table  1  shows  that  all  banking  groups  are  significantly 
involved  in lending  to the  industrial  sectors  which account for the  largest share  of  output  in  the 
aggregate economy: Trade, Services and Manufacturing.  Cooperative, savings, and commercial banks 
hold on average, respectively, 69 percent, 81 percent, and 89 percent of their bank loan portfolio with 
these sectors. For some of the smaller industrial sectors in terms of credit, one banking group clearly 
dominates lending. In Agriculture most bank lending comes from the credit cooperatives, while in 
Construction  both  savings  and  cooperatives  play  an  important  role.  Commercial  banks  dominate 
lending to Energy and Finance.  
 
Unreported  ANOVA results show  i) that banks within each banking group do not significantly differ 
in terms of balance sheet composition and ii) that significant differences in balance sheet composition 
exist between banking groups.
7 Overall, the stylized evidence suggests that bank lending  may be 
affected  both  by  banking  group  characteristics  and  industry  characteristics.  We  will  use  this 
information in the subsequent panel estimation to account for possible credit supply effects that arise 
from banking groups’ choice for specific lending portfolios.  
< Table 1 > 
 
4. Empirical Model 
We now turn to the empirical investigation of the effect of industry-specific cyclical determinants of 
credit demand on bank lending. We also investigate the role of monetary policy as a determinant of 
industry-specific  bank  lending.  The  evidence  allows  us  to  assess  the  importance  of  the  industry 
composition of credit portfolios as a determinant of monetary policy effectiveness.  
 
                                                            
6 Bank lending data are also available for nine sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry. To conserve on space, 
the descriptive statistics are not reported here, but available on request.  
7  Detailed results are available from the authors on request.   8 
4.1 Estimation Framework 
To identify the response of industry-specific bank lending to changes in monetary policy and industry-
specific credit demand, we apply the dynamic panel framework of Ehrmann et al. (2003), Worms 
(2003), and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004). Our analysis adds to the existing work by incorporating 




α β γ γ γ
γ γ ε
− − − −
= = = =
− − −
=
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
+ ∆ +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
p p p p
bi,t b ij bi,t j 1j M,t j 2,ij i,t j 3,ij i,t j
j 1 j 1 j 1 j 1
p
4 b,t 1 5j b,t 1 M,t j bi,t
j 1
L L r IP Price
X X r .
  (1) 
The coefficient αb is a bank-specific intercept which is included to allow for fixed effects across banks 
and εbi,t is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and constant variance, i.e. N ∼ (0,σ
2). Lbi,t denotes 
short-term lending by bank b to industry i at time t, with b =1,…,Nb and t = 1,…T. The autoregressive 
parameters βij are assumed to be the same across banks, but heterogeneous across industries. Equation 
(1) is expressed in log-differences, denoted by the symbol ∆, with the exception of the money market 
interest rate, where ∆ refers to the regular first difference.  
 
IPi,t approximates industry-specific output at time t. This variable serves as a measure of cyclically 
determined industry-specific credit demand. Pricei,t denotes the industry-specific price at time t. It is 
included  to  capture  cyclical fluctuations  in industry-specific  price  developments. Monetary  policy 
actions are represented by the change in the three-month money market interest rate ∆rM,t. We assume 
that the interest rate is strictly exogenous to bank lending. Worms (2003) provides evidence in support 
of this assumption. In order to identify the bank lending effects of monetary policy, the interest rate at 
time t-j (rM,t-j) is interacted with bank characteristics Xb,t-1 at time t-1.  
 
The vector of bank-specific characteristics Xb includes capitalization, broad and narrow liquidity and 
interbank claims, all of which are expressed as a ratio to total bank assets and normalized with respect 
                                                            
8 An alternative specification of (1) stacks bank lending by industry for all industries and captures industry 
effects, using dummies. The large number of banks and industries precludes this approach.    9 
to the average across all banks and time. Broad liquidity is defined as cash plus securities plus short-
term interbank claims. Possibly, the relation between broad liquidity and the monetary policy response 
of bank lending is dominated by short-term interbank claims (Worms, 2003 and Ehrmann and Worms, 
2004). Therefore, we follow Worms (2003) and split broad liquidity into two components: (i) narrow 
liquidity defined as the sum of cash and securities and (ii) short-term interbank claims. Consistent with 
the literature, we also include bank size in Xb to capture the effect of asymmetric information on bank 
credit supply. Bank size is measured as the log of a bank’s total assets in deviation from the average 
across all banks and time.
9 
 
In the empirical estimation of equation (1) we will consecutively include each bank characteristic 
individually in the specification. Bank characteristics are introduced with one lag to avoid endogeneity 
bias (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000; Ehrmann et al., 2003; Worms, 2003; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 
2004). To be able to present the empirical results in a concise form, we compute long-run elasticities 
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, where J=4. 
Since the long-run coefficients are a non-linear function of the estimated parameters, we derive the 
corresponding standard errors by means of the standard delta method.   With respect to the sign of our 
coefficients, we expect a rise in the interest rate – a monetary contraction – to result in lower lending, 
implying a negative interest rate effect. In line with the literature, we expect that the response of bank 
lending to monetary policy is less pronounced for larger, more liquid, and better capitalized banks. 
This holds if the coefficient on the interaction term between each bank characteristic and the interest 
rate is positive. The effect of industry output growth on bank lending growth is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, favorable economic conditions increase the number of investment projects with a positive net 
present  value  and,  hence,  credit  demand.  On  the  other  hand,  economic  growth  generates  higher 
                                                            
9 Worms (2003) and Ehrmann and Worms (2004) argue this may be inappropriate in the German institutional 
setting due to the tight relationship between the primary and head institutions of the savings and cooperative 
sector and the practice of savings banks and credit cooperatives to back their funds with mutual guarantees. If so, 
the interest rate sensitivity of small bank lending may not be higher than that of large banks. 
10In this we follow the literature (e.g., Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Worms, 2003; Ehrmann et al., 2003).    10 
internal  cash  flows  which  may  lower  credit  demand.  Most  of  the  evidence  supports  a  positive 
relationship between output and bank lending (De Bondt, 1998; Worms, 2003; Ehrmann et al., 2003; 
and  Gambacorta  and  Mistrulli,  2004).  Finally,  industry  inflation  is  anticipated  to  stimulate  bank 
lending growth. This relationship is attributable to the negative effect of positive price changes on real 
income and cash flows.  
4.2 Methodology  
The system in (1) represents a fixed effects dynamic (unbalanced) panel with large T and large N. 
Lagged values of the dependent variable are included to control for omitted variable and endogeneity 
bias. Because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term, dynamic panel models 
are typically not estimated with the static panel fixed effects estimator. Doing so would introduce a 
finite sample bias of order 1/T for N → ∞ and fixed T (see Nickell, 1981; Kiviet, 1995). In order to 
avoid biased and inconsistent estimates, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the use of a generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator. Recent studies have challenged this method. Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2001) have shown that the first-differenced GMM 
estimates are biased downwards in the direction of the within-group estimates. Alvarez and Arellano 
(2003) show that the GMM estimator is close to the fixed effects estimator for large T. Furthermore, 
Jung (2005) illustrates that Arrelano and Bond’s (1991) test of serial residual correlation may build on 
inconsistently estimated residuals. Because these are used to decide on the optimal over-identifying 
restrictions, coefficient estimates are likely to be inconsistent.  
 
In view of this and given a large set of data points in the time dimension, we estimate the dynamic 
panel model by using the fixed effects estimator. In order to ensure that autocorrelation in the residuals 
does not result in inconsistent and inefficient estimators we compute White-period standard errors 
(Arellano, 1987) which are robust to arbitrary serial correlation and time-varying variances in the 
residuals. We test for the existence of first-order and second-order serial autocorrelation by regressing 
the within regression residuals against their one- and two-period lag. The underlying model allows for 
fixed effects and White-period standard errors.   11 
 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section we present and discuss the results of the dynamic panel estimation. The empirical 
model is estimated for short-term lending over a sample which includes the primary institutions of the 
commercial, savings, and credit cooperative sector. This group is referred to as the aggregate banking 
group.  Potentially,  lending  heterogeneity  may  be  caused  by  variation  in  bank’s  choices  of  credit 
portfolio  composition  as  well  as  by  variation  in  bank-customer  relations  due  to  unobserved  firm 
characteristics and by credit demand effects. We already reported that significant differences in banks’ 
balance sheet exist between banking groups but not within groups. To capture banking group-specific 
effects we initially include dummies for the savings and commercial banking group. These turn out to 
be statistically insignificant in almost all specifications. The subsequent evidence for the aggregate 
banking group excludes the banking group dummies.  
5.1 ANOVA Results  
To condense and structure the subsequent analysis of the empirical findings, this subsection reports 
ANOVA results for the long-run coefficients of (1). Our aim is to explore the sensitivity of the long-
run coefficients of industry output growth, industry inflation, and the interest rate change to the choice 
of bank characteristic, and the choice of industry and banking group.  
 
We first investigate whether the estimates of the long-run coefficients of industry output growth, 
industry inflation, and the interest rate change are influenced by the choice of bank characteristic Xb, 
i.e. bank asset size, capitalization, broad and narrow liquidity, and short-term interbank claims. To this 
end,  we estimate equation  (1)  for all  combinations of  9 industries  –  including  the  grand total  of 
industries – and five bank characteristics. The subsequent ANOVA results (Table 2) show that the 
choice of bank characteristic does not significantly affect the long-run sensitivity of bank lending with 
respect to either industry-specific credit demand or the interest rate.  
 
   12 
< Table 2> 
 
Next,  we  investigate  whether  the  variation  in  long-run  coefficients  is  accounted  for  mostly  by 
industries or by banking groups. To this end, we estimate equation (1) for all combinations of eight 
industries and four banking groups. Since the group of commercial banks has too few observations, it 
is excluded from the analysis. Next to the group of savings banks, we include three (sub) groups of 
cooperatives, rural cooperatives, commercial credit cooperatives, and Raiffeisen banks. We only report 
the results bank asset size, noting that the evidence for the other bank characteristics does not differ.
11 
Table 3 summarizes the key results. The variation in the responsiveness of bank lending to industry 
output growth, industry inflation, and interest rate changes can be attributed to industry, but not to 
banking group. That is, the evidence shows discernible industry dissimilarities in the bank lending 
effects of changes in credit demand and monetary policy. 
 
< Table 3 > 
 
The ANOVA evidence illustrates that industries are the more important source of differences in the 
bank lending effects of industry credit demand and monetary policy. Motivated by these findings and 
to condense on space, the following section presents and discusses the evidence of the dynamic panel 
estimation  (1)  on  the  determinants  of  industry-specific  short-term  bank  lending  growth  for  the 
aggregate banking group only. 
 
5.2 Evidence from Industry-Specific Bank Lending Functions 
Since table 2 shows that long-run coefficients for output, growth, inflation and the interest rate do not 
significantly  differ  for  different  bank  characteristics,  we  choose  to  only  present  the  coefficient 
estimates for the industry-specific bank lending functions including bank size in table 4.
12 We report 
evidence for individual industries and for the grand total of industries. The evidence for the grand total 
                                                            
11 The ANOVA test statistics for estimations with bank capitalization, liquidity, and interbank assets and for 
aggregate lending are available on request.   13 
is our benchmark in the following discussion and allows for comparison with earlier studies which do 
not adopt an industry-specific focus. Table 4 also reports the short-run coefficients on the one period 
lags of bank size. Since these have no intrinsic meaning, we do not discuss them here. 
 
< Table 4 > 
 
5.2.1 The Bank Lending Effects of Loan Demand and Monetary Policy 
First, we focus on the response of bank lending growth to changes in credit demand (i.e., industry 
output growth, industry inflation) and to changes in the interest rate. Table 4 illustrates that bank 
lending to the grand total of industries increases in response to higher output growth. This response 
reflects the statistically significant and positive responses of lending to growth in construction, trade, 
and services. At least for the construction sector, the positive reaction of bank lending is influenced by 
the  1992-1995  re-unification  construction  boom.  The  opposite  relationship  exists  for  the 
manufacturing sector, suggesting that manufacturing firms demand less credit in response to output 
growth.  Deutsche  Bundesbank  (1996)  arrives  at  a similar conclusion.  Possible  reasons  are  higher 
internal  flows  of  finance which  reduce  external financing  needs  and/or the absence  of  promising 
economic  prospects  which  yield  disincentives  for  investment.  Indeed,  German  manufacturing  has 
experienced  a continuous decline in  terms  of  relative  value  added  during  the 1990s.  Next  to the 
manufacturing  industry,  we  also  find  an  inverse  relationship  between  lending  growth  and  output 
growth for the finance sector. In contrast to the manufacturing industry, the finance sector accounts for 
an increasingly larger share of aggregate value added. The decline in bank lending may hence reflect 
the effect of higher internal cash flows which reduce the need for bank finance.  
 
The response of bank lending growth to inflation is significant and positive for the grand total of 
industries. This reflects a positive response in almost all industries. The exceptions are the transport 
and finance industry. Bank lending to the transport sector significantly contracts in response to higher 
industry inflation. Bank lending to the finance industry, in turn, does not significantly respond to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 Results for the specifications using other bank characteristics are available on request.   14 
industry inflation.  
 
Turning to the response of bank lending to changes in interest rates, the evidence in Table 4 confirms 
the view that interest rate increases lead to a contraction in lending to the grand total of industries. The 
decline in bank lending reflects the negative effect of higher interest rates on bank reserves and credit 
rationing on the part of banks in response to an increase in the risk of loan default. We find substantial 
cross-industry variation in the response of bank lending to interest rates. A negative response is found 
in  the  energy,  manufacturing,  and  transport  industries,  with  the  interest  rate  effect  being  most 
pronounced for the first two sectors. We attribute this to the comparatively high capital intensity of 
production (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1996). In contrast, a monetary policy contraction induces higher 
lending to the construction, trade, and finance industries.  
 
The positive interest rate response of lending to construction is inconsistent with expectations. A 
potential  explanation  may  be  found  in  the  specific  structural  and  cyclical  characteristics  of  the 
construction sector. The construction industry is characterized by a large share of small firms which 
predominantly obtain credit from local credit cooperatives and regional savings banks. Knowledge of 
local market conditions and local debtors reduces information asymmetries and fosters ‘housebank’ 
relationships. During periods of high interest rates and low demand, housebank relationships facilitate 
the access to bank finance. Considering cyclical factors, the positive interest rate response of bank 
lending reflects the demand-driven re-unification boom in construction. During the 1991-1992 period 
of  high  interest  rates,  demand  for  residential  buildings  and  production  plants  was  high  and  even 
continued to increase.  
 
The positive interest rate response of bank lending to the finance industry may be explained in terms 
of financial stability considerations. A contraction in monetary policy lowers the net present value of 
financial assets and impedes the ability of finance and insurance companies to generate profits on asset 
portfolios. As a result, portfolio holders may withdraw their funds from the finance sector. Besides 
return considerations, portfolio holders may also withdraw funds to accommodate the negative effect   15 
of higher interest rates on internal cash flows. The drain of funds reduces the ability of finance and 
insurance companies to meet liquidity requirements. This development may constitute a threat to the 
stability of the sector. In view of this, the positive response may describe the efforts of banks to ensure 
the stability of the financial system.  
 
Overall, the evidence illustrates that the use of aggregate lending provides an incomplete view on the 
bank lending effects of credit demand and monetary policy. Our results indicate that the direction and 
strength of bank lending effects depend on the industry composition of credit portfolios. In turn, this 
suggests that the effectiveness of monetary policy may also depend on industry structure.  
5.2.2 The Interaction between Bank Characteristics and Monetary Policy 
So far, the discussion has focused on the direct effects of monetary policy on bank lending growth. 
This section analyzes the interaction terms between bank characteristics and monetary policy to draw 
conclusions about the existence of a bank lending channel and the bank variable through which the 
channel  operates.  Table  5  contains  the  estimates  of  the  interaction  term  coefficients  that  capture 
industry-specific bank lending effects of monetary policy associated with cross-bank differences in 
asset size, capitalization, liquidity, or short-term interbank claims. Conclusions regarding the bank 
lending effects of monetary policy transmission are sensitive to the choice of bank characteristic and 
vary with the choice of industry.  
< Table 5 > 
 
The  evidence  lends  strong  support  to  the  existence  of  bank  size  effects  in  monetary  policy 
transmission. For the grand total of industries and for almost all sampled industries, a monetary policy 
contraction causes bank lending of large banks to adjust less than bank credit of small banks. That is, 
large banks are better able to insulate their lending activities against monetary-policy-induced changes 
in the availability of funding. Inconsistent with the credit channel theory, the interest rate response of 
bank lending to the finance industry is more pronounced for large than for small banks. This finding 
possibly reflects the importance of commercial banks as source of lending to the finance industry   16 
(Table 1) and the fact that commercial banks are on average larger in terms of asset size than savings 
banks and credit cooperatives. Insignificant effects are recorded in estimations for the construction and 
transport sector.  
 
In contrast to bank asset size, cross-bank heterogeneities in capitalization do not explain cross-bank 
differences  in  the  interest  rate  sensitivity  of  credit  to  the  grand  total  of  industries  and  to  most 
individual industries. The exception is lending to agriculture, finance, services, and manufacturing. 
Except for the agricultural sector, better capitalized banks adjust lending less than poorly capitalized 
banks.  
 
Cross-bank asymmetries in the monetary policy response of lending can be attributed to cross-bank 
heterogeneities  in  liquidity.  As  discussed,  the  liquidity  effects  of  monetary  policy  are  separately 
identified  for  a  broad  and  narrow  measure  of  liquidity  and  for  short-term  interbank  claims.  The 
evidence shows that broad and/or narrow liquidity significantly attenuate the interest rate response of 
lending  to  the  grand  total  of  industries  and  to  the  agricultural,  construction,  trade,  and  transport 
industry.  The  evidence  only  lends  weak  support  to  the  role  of  short-term  interbank  claims  as 
determinant of liquidity effects. Indeed, significant short-term interbank effects are confined to few 
industries: construction, trade, and transport. In addition, because interbank claims are insignificant in 
explaining  the  interest rate  response  of lending  to  industries  for  which  bank  asset  size  possesses 
explanatory  power,  bank  asset  size  appears  to  capture  the  bank  lending  effects  of  information 
asymmetries. That is, the evidence in the present study does not lend support to the finding of Worms 
(2003) according to which interbank claims dwarf the effects associated with bank asset size.  
 
Overall, the evidence lends weak support to the transmission of monetary policy changes through bank 
lending. More importantly, the conclusions as to the bank lending effects of monetary policy are 
sensitive to the choice of industry. This provides suggestive evidence of the existence of industry 
effects of monetary policy on bank lending through the credit supply side. In view of this, studies for 
the grand total of industries are likely to provide an incomplete view of the credit channel effects of   17 
monetary policy.  
5.2.3 Comparison with other Results  
For the grand total of industries, our evidence can be compared with that of existing studies. Our 
results only partly match those in Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Worms (2003). Possible sources of 
divergence are our exclusion of household lending from the analysis, the use of a different outlier 
adjustment procedure and, most importantly, a different estimation method. Earlier studies estimate 
the dynamic panel model with GMM. We find this estimator to be inapplicable and prefer the fixed 
effects panel estimator.  
 
Both our finding that bank lending grows in response to output growth and inflation and declines in 
the  wake  of  monetary  contraction  and  our  finding  that  cross-bank  differences  in the  interest rate 
sensitivity  of  aggregate  bank  credit  cannot  be  attributed  to  differences  in  capitalization,  but  to 
differences in liquidity are consistent with Ehrmann et al. (2003). On the other hand, our evidence 
suggests that bank size is an appropriate proxy of bank lending effects of monetary policy, which is in 
contrast with Worms (2003) and Ehrmann and Worms (2004).  
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper uses a unique dataset with bank-level data on balance sheet items and industry lending to 
investigate the bank lending effects of credit demand and monetary policy for Germany over the 
period 1992-2002. In contrast to existing work, we focus on customer heterogeneity by estimating the 
industry effects of bank lending. In line with earlier studies, we use bank asset size, capitalization, 
liquidity, and short-term interbank claims as proxy variables of cross-bank differences in the severity 
of information asymmetries.  
 
Our  empirical  findings  suggest  that  bank  lending  growth  predominantly  depends  on  the  industry 
composition of bank loan portfolios and the underlying cyclical fluctuations in bank credit demand. 
Credit supply effects of monetary policy changes depend on bank asset size and bank liquidity, but not   18 
on capitalization and interbank claims. As the magnitude of the credit supply effect differs across 
industries,  the  aggregate  credit  supply  effects  of  monetary  policy  again  depend  on  the  industry 
composition of a credit portfolio. The evidence thus strongly points to the importance of the industry 
composition of bank credit portfolios as determinant of monetary policy effectiveness. Overall, we 
conclude that research on monetary policy transmission should take industry effects into account. In 
the end, to investigate the ultimate sources of credit heterogeneity across firms and banks in Germany, 
information on the firm level, including among others size, capitalization, capital-intensity, operational 
risk, and operating surplus, will be necessary in our view. This falls beyond the scope of the current 
paper and is left for future research.  
   19 
References 
Altunbas,  Y.,  L.  Gambacorta,  D.  Marques-Ibanez  (2009).  Securitisation  and  the  Bank  Lending 
Channel. European Economic Review, 53 (8), pp. 996-1009.  
Altunbas, Y., L. Gambacorta, D. Marques-Ibanez (2010). Bank Risk and Monetary Policy. Journal of 
Financial Stability, 6 (3), pp. 121-129. 
Altunbaş, Y., O. Fazylov, and P. Molyneux (2002). Evidence on the Bank Lending Channel in Europe. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 26, pp. 2093-2110.  
Alvarez, J. and M. Arellano (2003). The Time Series and Cross-Section Asymptotics of Dynamic 
Panel Data Estimators. Econometrica, Vol. 71, pp. 1121-1159.  
Arellano,  M.  (1987).  Computing  Robust  Standard  Errors  for  Within-Groups  Estimators.  Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 49, pp. 431-434.  
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence 
and an Application to Employment Equations. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, pp. 277-
297.  
Arnold, I.J.M. and E.B. Vrugt (2004). Firm Size, Industry Mix, and the Regional Transmission of 
Monetary Policy in Germany. German Economic Review, Vol. 5 (1), pp. 35-59.   
Barran, F., V. Coudert, and B. Mojon (1997). The Transmission of Monetary Policy in the European 
Countries. In: S.C. Collignon (ed.): European Monetary Policy, London, pp. 81-111.  
Bernanke,  B.S.  and  M.  Gertler  (1989).  Agency  Costs,  Net  Worth,  and  Business  Fluctuations. 
American Economic Review, Vol. 79 (1), pp. 14-31.  
Blinder,  A.S.,  Ehrmann  M.,  Fratzscher  M.,  de  Haan,  J.  and  Jansen  D.-J.  (2008).  Central  Bank 
Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 46 (4), pp. 910–45. 
Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998). Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data 
Models. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, pp. 115-143.  
Blundell,  R.,  S.  Bond,  and  F.  Windmeijer  (2001).  Estimation  in  Dynamic  Panel  Data  Models: 
Improving on the Performance of the Standard GMM Estimators. In: T.B. Fomby and R.C. Hill 
(eds.):  Nonstationary  Panels,  Panel  Cointegration,  and  Dynamic  Panels.  Advances  in 
Econometrics, Vol. 15. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.53-91. 
Boivin, J., M.T. Kiley, and F. S. Mishkin (2010). How Has the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
Evolved Over Time? Handbook of Monetary Economics, 2010, forthcoming. 
Bondt,  G.J.  De  (1998).  Credit  Channels  in  Europe:  Bank-Level  Panel  Data  Analyses.  De 
Nederlandsche Bank: Research Memorandum WO&E no. 543.  
Chatelain, J.-B., A. Generale, I. Hernando, U. von Kalckreuth, P. Vermeulen (2003). Firm Investment 
and Monetary Transmission in the Euro Area. In: I. Angeloni, A. Kashyap, and B. Mojon (eds.): 
Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area. Cambridge University Press, chapter 7.  
Ciccarelli, M., A. Maddaloni, and J.-l. Peydró (2010). Trusting the bankers – A new look at the credit 
channel of monetary policy. European Central Bank Working Paper Series No. 1228. 
Corney,  D.  (2002).  Intelligent  Analysis  of  Small  Data  Sets  for  Food  Design.  University  College 
London. Dissertation.    20 
Dale, S. and A.G. Haldane (1995). Interest Rates and the Channels of Monetary Transmission: Some 
Sectoral Estimates. European Economic Review, Vol. 39 (9), pp. 1611-1626.  
Dedola, L. and F. Lippi (2005). The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Evidence from the Industries 
of Five OECD Countries. European Economic Review, Vol. 49 (6), pp. 1543 - 1569.  
Deutsche Bundesbank (1996). Kreditentwicklung nach Kreditnehmern und Bankengruppen. Deutsche 
Bundesbank: Monthly Report, Vol. 48 (10), pp. 49-63.  
Disyatat, P. (2010). The Bank Lending Channel Revisited. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. 
BIS Working Paper No. 297. 
Ehrmann,  M.,  L.  Gambacorta,  J.  Martínez-Pagés,  P.  Sevestre,  and  A.  Worms  (2003).  Financial 
Systems  and  the  Role  of  Banks  in  Monetary  Policy  Transmission  in  the  Euro  Area.  In:  I. 
Angeloni, A. Kashyap, and B. Mojon (eds.): Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area. 
Cambridge University Press.  
Favero, C.A., F. Giavazzi, and L. Flabbi (1999). The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy in 
Europe: Evidence from Bank’s Balance Sheets. Cambridge, Mass.: NBER WP 7231.  
Fuinhas, J.A. (2006). Monetary Transmission and Bank Lending in Portugal: A Sectoral Approach. 
Universidade da Beira Interior. Discussion Paper No. 01/2006. 
Gambacorta, L. (2003). The Italian Banking System and Monetary Policy Transmission: Evidence 
from  Bank  Level  Data.  In:  I.  Angeloni,  A.  Kashyap,  and  B.  Mojon  (eds.):  Monetary  Policy 
Transmission in the Euro Area. Cambridge University Press, pp. 323-334.   
Gambacorta, L. and P.E. Mistrulli (2004). Does Bank Capital Affect Lending Behavior? Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, Vol. 13, pp. 435-457.  
Gertler,  M.  and  S.  Gilchrist    (1993).  The  Cyclical  Behavior  of  Short-Term  Business  Lending. 
European Economic Review, Vol. 37, pp. 623-631.  
Guiso, L., A. K. Kashyap, F. Panetta and D. Terlizzese (1999), Will a Common European Monetary 
Policy Have Asymmetric Effects?, Economics Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
pp. 56–75.  
Haan, J.  De (2003). The Impact  of Monetary  Policy  on  Bank  Lending  in  the  Netherlands.  In:  I. 
Angeloni, A. Kashyap, and B. Mojon (eds.): Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area. 
Cambridge University Press, Chapter 20.   
Haan, L. De and E. Sterken (2006). The impact of monetary policy on the financing behaviour of 
firms in the Euro area and the UK. The European Journal of Finance, 12 (5), pp. 401 – 420. 
Hackethal,  A.  (2004).  German  Banks  and  Banking  Structure.  In: J.P.  Krahnen  and  R.H.  Schmidt 
(eds.). The German Financial System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 69-105.  
Jiménez, G., S. Ongena, J.-L. Peydró, and J. Saurina (2010). Credit Supply – Identifying Balance-
Sheet Channels with Loan Applications and Granted Loans. Frankfurt/Main: European Central 
Bank. Working Paper Series No. 1179. 
Jung, H. (2005). A Test for Autocorrelation in Dynamic Panel Data Models. Hitotsubashi University: 
Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series No. 77.  
Kakes, J., J.-E. Sturm, and P. Maier (2001). Monetary Transmission and Bank Lending in Germany. 
Kredit und Kapital (4).    21 
Kakes,  J.  and  J.-E.  Sturm  (2002).  Monetary  Policy  and  Bank  Lending:  Evidence  from  German 
Banking Groups. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 26, pp. 2077-2092.  
Kalckreuth,  U.  von  (2003).  Monetary  Transmission  in  Germany:  New  Perspectives  on  Financial 
Constraints and Investment Spending. In: I. Angeloni, A. Kashyap, and B. Mojon (eds.): Monetary 
Policy Transmission in the Euro Area. Cambridge University Press, pp. 173-186.  
Kashyap,  A.K.  and  J.C.  Stein  (1995).  The  Impact  of  Monetary  Policy  on  Bank  Balance  Sheets. 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 42, pp. 151-195.  
Kashyap,  A.K.  and  J.C.  Stein  (2000).  What  Do  a  Million  Observations  on  Banks  Say  about  the 
Transmission of Monetary Policy? American Economic Review, Vol. 90, pp. 407-428.  
Kiviet, J. (1995). On Bias, Inconsistency, and Efficiency of Some Estimators in Dynamic Panel Data 
Models. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68 (1), pp. 63-78.  
Mojon, B., F. Smets, and P. Vermeulen (2002). Investment and Monetary Policy in the Euro Area. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 26 (11), pp. 2111-2129.  
Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects. Econometrica, Vol. 49, pp. 1417-
1426.  
Peek, J. and E. Rosengren (1995). Bank Lending and the Transmission of Monetary Policy. In: J. Peek 
and E. Rosengren (eds.): Is Bank Lending Important for the Transmission of Monetary Policy? 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series, Vol. 39, pp. 47-68.  
Trautwein, H.-M. (2000). The Credit View, Old and New. Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 14 (2), 
pp. 155-189.  
Worms, A. (2003). Interbank Relationships and the Credit Channel in Germany. Empirica, Vol. 30 (2), 







   22 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Short-Term Bank Lending to Industries 
1992:1-2002:4   
           
 Lending to:     N   Mean  Stdev  Skew.  Kurtosis 
           
           
Agriculture           
 Commercial BG     3,060    0.04    0.10    6.35    48.10  
 Savings BG     24,292    0.04    0.04    3.06    17.56  
 Cooperative BG     93,216    0.13    0.13    1.88    7.59  
           
Energy           
 Commercial BG     2,564    0.04    0.12    6.06    47.45  
 Savings BG     17,606    0.01    0.02    7.37    95.52  
 Cooperative BG     33,024    0.01    0.03    9.52    191.63  
           
Construction             
 Commercial BG     3,916    0.06    0.06    2.38    14.02  
 Savings BG     25,030    0.15    0.06    1.00    4.84  
 Cooperative BG     94,296    0.17    0.10    1.35    6.64  
           
Trade           
 Commercial BG     5,308    0.33    0.27    1.23    3.69  
 Savings BG     24,939    0.25    0.08    0.54    4.23  
 Cooperative BG     94,422    0.22    0.11    0.98    7.19  
           
Transport           
 Commercial BG     3,960    0.03    0.05    4.13    28.94  
 Savings BG     24,720    0.03    0.03    4.06    37.58  
 Cooperative BG     83,667    0.03    0.06    63.72    8,349  
           
Finance            
 Commercial BG     5,088    0.11    0.35    24.50    925.41  
 Savings BG     24,392    0.01    0.01    8.79    149.53  
 Cooperative BG     70,116    0.01    0.03    19.00    600.86  
           
Services           
 Commercial BG     5,367    0.42    0.98    64.95    4,565  
 Savings BG     25,031    0.31    0.12    0.61    3.54  
 Cooperative BG     95,445    0.25    0.15    1.41    6.85  
           
Manufacturing             
 Commercial BG     4,957    0.22    0.18    1.91    10.45  
 Savings BG     25,039    0.22    0.10    0.91   4.04  
 Cooperative BG     95,240    0.21    0.11    1.14    6.13  
           
 
Short-term lending to industry i is expressed relative to short-term lending to the grand total of industries. The 
data are from the quarterly borrower statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. For each banking group, the sum 
of  the  means  deviates  from  one  due  to  rounding  and  due  to  the  use  of  unbalanced  sets  of  bank-quarter 
observations.  Besides  missing  observations,  the  cross-industry  differences  in  the  number  of  bank-quarter 
observations also result from the removal of outliers.   23 
 
Table 2: One-Way ANOVA Test Statistics: Bank Characteristics versus Industry 
                 
           
Long-Run Coef.:    Source of Variation    SS  DF  MS  F-statistic 
                 
           
∆IP  Bank Characteristics   0.043  4  0.011  0.003 
  Industry  164  40  4.11   
           
∆Price  Bank Characteristics  0.669  4  0.167  0.043 
  Industry  157  40  3.93   
           
∆IR  Bank Characteristics  0.0002  4  0.0000  0.086 
  Industry  0.024  40  0.001   
                 
Notes: Notes: Columns 3 to 6 report the results for the hypothesis that the long-run elasticities do not differ 
across estimates that differ in the choice of bank characteristic (bank asset size, bank capitalization, narrow 
liquidity, broad liquidity or short-term interbank claims). The ANOVA test statistics are reported for short-term 




Table 3: Two-Way ANOVA Test Statistics: Banking Group versus Industry 
                 
           
Long-Run Coef.:    Source of Variation    SS  DF  MS  F-statistic 
                 
           
∆IP  Banking Group  12.66  3  4.22  0.88 
  Industry  141  7  20.19  4.21
* 
           
∆Price  Banking Group  19.92  3  6.64  1.25 
  Industry  140  7  20.07  3.77* 
           
∆IR  Banking Group  0.001  3  0.0004  1.31 
  Industry  0.025  7  0.004  11.80* 
                 
Notes: The results refer to estimations with bank asset size. The banking group involves savings banks, rural 
and commercial credit cooperatives, and Raiffeisen banks. The industry dimension includes 8 industries at the 
one-digit level.* denotes the statistical significance at the one percent level. 
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Table 4: Long-Run Coefficients for Short-Term Lending by the Aggregate Banking Group 
  Total  Agriculture  Energy  Construction  Trade     Transport        Finance  Services  Manufacturing 
                     
Long-Run Coef.                     
∆IP  0.539*  0.257   1.173   0.716*   1.724*    0.169    -5.550* 
 
1.456**   -0.588* 
  (0.100)  (0.158)   (1.422)  (0.100)  (0.269)    (0.323)  (0.529)  (0.611)  (0.139) 
∆Price  3.535*  0.462*   4.712*  5.248*   1.436*     -0.392***  0.178   1.882*   2.969* 
  (0.206)  (0.135)  (1.720)  (0.273)  (0.083)    (0.228)  (0.617)  (0.221)  (0.589) 
∆IR   -0.023*  0.001  -0.074*  0.007*  0.009*     -0.008**   0.032*  -0.003   -0.009* 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.015)  (0.003)  (0.002)    (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Size*∆IR   0.003*   0.005*  0.024*  -0.001  0.006*    0.003   -0.010**   0.004*   0.006* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.001)    (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
                     
Short-Run Coef.                      
Sizet-1   0.015*   -0.014*  0.069**   -0.010** 
 
0.008***    0.004   0.108*   0.023*  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.031)  (0.005)  (0.004)    (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
                     
Obs  91,047  85,083  28,012  87,533  87,408    75,907  54,406  88,32  89,297 
# Banks  3,397  3,281  1,900  3,342  3,356    3,151  2,812  3,389  3,370 
R2-adj.  0.03  0.05  0.11  0.04  0.05    0.05  0.06  0.02  0.05 
AR(1)  0.26  0.08  0.88  0.25  0.10    0.08  0.87  0.08  0.15 
AR(2)  0.03  0.25  0.08  0.06  0.05    0.03  0.07  0.04  0.10 
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Table 5: Long-Run Interaction Coefficients per Industry 
   
Bank Characteristic   
 
Size  Cap  Bliq  Nliq  Ibk   
         
Industry           
Total   0.003*  0.162   0.061*   0.064*  0.025 
  (0.001)  (0.112)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.027) 
           
Agriculture   0.005*   -0.734*   0.084*   0.074*  0.030 
  (0.001)  (0.213)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.049) 
           
Energy  0.024*  -1.903  0.216  0.126  0.364 
  (0.008)  (1.143)  (0.135)  (0.137)  (0.280) 
           
Construction  -0.001  0.164  0.045***  0.022  0.103*** 
  (0.002)  (0.237)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.056) 
           
Trade  0.006*  0.140  0.043**  0.018  0.090** 
  (0.001)  (0.179)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.046) 
           
Transport  0.003  0.333  0.033  0.084**   -0.207** 
  (0.002)  (0.376)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.086) 
           
Finance   -0.010**   1.514*  0.044  0.111  -0.222 
  (0.004)  (0.584)  (0.074)  (0.075)  (0.166) 
           
Services   0.004*  0.386***  0.004  0.018  -0.041 
  (0.001)  (0.208)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.052) 
           
Manufacturing   0.006*   0.515*  -0.010  0.007  -0.035 
  (0.001)  (0.192)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.045) 
           
           
 